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Introduction
A Revolution in Tropes
Jane S. Sutton and Mari Lee Mifsud

When you change the way you look at things, the things you look at change MaxPlank 1

Our view of tropes is that they are rhetoric's own unique resources, but for
ineluctable historiographical reasons have been more or less closed off from
the production of theory. Our "trope project" began simply enough. If the
workings of tropes could be identified in a new way, then the aim and
purpose of rhetoric could be retheorized in terms new to democratic deliberation. Working under the slogan "Yes, tropes-but all of them," 2 we attempted a new classification system based on the Greek roots of hundreds of
tropes listed in various old and new sources such as Bernard Dupriez's A
Dictionary of Literary Devices, A-Z and Richard Lanham's A Handlist of
Rhetorical Tenns, respectively.
Our suggestion led us to create charts of tropes. Eventually after several
starts, we organized a heck of a lot of tropes in relation to their function
specified by their root domain. Metaphor fell under the category of the root
phora; anastrophe under strophe; and antimetabole under bole. The work
was tedious. We quit working on it from time to time. Our trope project
seemed to be getting us closer and closer to just compiling pages and pages
of excel spreadsheets, but all the while farther from our question, how do
tropes work?
One day, unexpectedly, we discovered through our root work that a connection exists between the trope antistrophe and katastrophe. 3 Bascially,
katastrophe is a subset of antistrophe which effectively binds them uniquely.
The binding sequence appears in Aristotle's Rhetoric and functions in a static
XI
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model straight away to originate and uphold a theory of civic discourse.
When we recognized this, we were stunned and began down another route.
We are jumping ahead of ourselves. We should start over, at the very beginning.
When we met some twenty years ago, Jane, writing on the history and
theory of rhetoric, was immersed in the study of Aristotle's Physics. Mari
Lee, a doctoral student in rhetoric, wondered why. She learned that Jane was
trying to figure something out about Aristotle's view of contingency in rhetoric. Jane was finding from Aristotle's idea of an earth at rest that his rhetoric
was not only built for a polis but also that it was designed in the earth's
model. That is, Rhetoric, the polis, and the earth are interconnected. In one of
our first conversations, we found ourselves astonished as we recognized that,
to the extent that Rhetoric is influenced by Aristotle's desire to bring a
people to rest, Aristotle's rhetorical theory is an art of denying contingency
rather than affirming it in civic life.
We both remember how alienating our exchanges were. That contingency
is the heart of Aristotle's Rhetoric is akin to a first principle of rhetorical
studies. How could rhetoric be an art of denying rather than affirming contingency? And what would this mean for future rhetorical theorizing?
As we ventured into the question of contingency, it became an object of
study with respect to both rhetorical theory and the history of rhetoric. We
began at the beginning, the first line of Aristotle's Rhetoric: "Rhetoric is the
counterpart [antistrophos] to dialectic." 4 Our first lesson in analyzing rhetoric's relation with dialectic is that rhetoric is prefigured by the trope
antistrophe. The resulting insight into the "tropics'' of Rhetoric led to our
recognition that rhetoric's antistrophic relationship with dialectic is not neutral,5 and we wondered how antistrophe functioned in Aristotle's construction of contingency.
We situated antistrophe in a particular construction of contingency,
namely one oriented toward bringing people to a rest in accordance with
Aristotle's rational account of change in his model of the earth. We discovered that when paired with contingency, particular tropes provide an interested way of making contact with the other. The trope antistrophe entails a
unique tropical style called katastrophe wherein the activity of turning
(strophe) down (kata) the other occurs. Within this configuration, the slave,
the barbarian, the alien, the stranger, and women embody aspects of contingency related to an unnatural change that rhetoric has expunged in its antistrophic model to dialectic. As Aristotle puts it, the most appropriate trope
for stylizing antistrophic rhetoric is "katastrophe," quite literally a style that
"turns down" other possible meanings so that a single one can be settled
upon by "all, or the majority, or the wise" among us. 6 While we certainly see
the value and significance of the majority in the conceptual context ofrhetorical theory, we also see something else. We see how contact is configured in
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antistrophic rhetoric also creates a way of turning down the other in an effort
to achieve a single resting place settled upon by "all, or the majority, or the
wise" among us. We wonder where the rhetorical theory is for unsettling this
resting place when it turns out to be a place of oppression for others?
The question how might rhetoric make contact with difference? creates a
responsibility to discover how the art systemically excludes the other, and
then based on that knowledge, to provide not only the resources but also the
means for theorizing rhetoric anew to meet the demands of civic engagement
that it is called to perfonn in the contemporary world. Eventually, our trope
project-our enonnous number of excel spreadsheets-took us down a route,
mostly esoteric. Then once again and unexpectedly we stumbled upon a trope
whose orientation is the other-alloi6sis.
And so we pursued the trope of the other. We ventured even further
beyond the tropes contained within the Rhetoric and even traditional
historiography, and now offer another trope, one of the other-alloi6sis.
Could this trope be figured with contingency so as to create new relations
with the other? What would the trope of the other mean for future rhetorical
theorizing? As should be apparent by now-after hearing about our attempts
at creating a new classification system of tropes-we will barely scratch the
surface of an enormous tropological terrain as we try to present possible
ways for this to happen. Nevertheless, we theorize that rhetoric can cease
being reductive if other tropes can emerge. For starters, such tropes could
come out of the discovery that the concept of contingency built on a principle
of rest has distorted perceptions of contact, the other, and authority and turn
us otherwise.
This book presents a collection of sorts of the conversations we have had
across two decades of working together. A small part of our conversations
has seen the light of day in earlier published essays, from which we draw in
this book As our conversation evolved over the years, it began to extend
beyond our interpersonal dyad to include others. In this volume, we are
joined by Michele Kennerly and Marie-Odile N. Hobeika to explore alloiostrophic rhetorical history, theory, and practice. In what follows in this Introduction, we wish to give you, our readers, a fuller sense of why we write,
where we are coming from, what we collectively offer in this volume, and
where we aim to go.
Because a new approach to rhetorical theorizing comes out of the discovery that assumptions regarding contingency have distorted perceptions of
how rhetoric functions in the civic realm, then questions of democracy and
rhetoric's relation to its ideals and practices must be engaged. Democracy is,
after all, why rhetoric is claimed to have been theorized by Aristotle in the
first place. In the civic realm, Aristotle affinned that we can never know
essentially or necessarily, only ever probabilistically, because the contingencies of civic life are too great. So, the story goes, he theorized an art of
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rhetoric to train our deliberation and decision making in the condition of
contingency to produce wise practical judgments, decisions that are likely to
be best for the greater good. If rhetoric takes as its effect the denial of
contingency, what hope for democracy have we?
This traditional narrative affirming the centrality of contingency in Aristotle's rhetorical theory is conjoined with a mythic resonance of rhetoric
being a gift from Zeus. The story goes something like this: The peopledemos (from which the English word democracy is derived)-were living
like animals. 7 Without civilization they "at first lived scattered ... there were
no cities." 8 The people had fire; they had ways to get food; they could build
houses. What they did not have was a way to settle their differences. Whenever "they formed communities," they would resort to violence since the
people lacked a way of making decisions. 9 For Zeus the people's violence
was wrecking his idea of people living peacefully. Zeus wanted to create
civilization. So Zeus asked one of his lackeys-the god Hermes also known
as Mercury-to distribute rhetoric among the people. The gift of rhetoric
would enable the demos to settle their differences by means of speech rather
than by means of violence. How should we distribute this art? Hermes asked
Zeus. "Shall I," inquired Hermes, the god of rhetoric, "distribute [the art] in
the same way that the arts have been distributed? For example, one physician
is enough to treat many laymen, and it is the same with other craftsmen." 10 In
other words, should rhetoric-the power to speak-be distributed to only a
few? Zeus thought for a moment. Give rhetoric to everyone, Zeus said, and
distribute its power equally. Zeus explained to Hermes that civilization
would not come into being if only a few shared the art. It is said that democracy was born the day that rhetoric was distributed as a gift to all the people.
Rhetoric shapes democracy because, insofar as it offers people-demos-a
tool, it enables them to conduct the business ofliving together.
From the vision of everyone receiving rhetoric emerges the impression of
equality. Since all were given rhetoric then all can speak; all can participate
in the deliberative process and make decisions about what to do. Yet, we
know this same mythic scene finds Penelope being shouted at by her son
Telemachus when she, according to him, dared violate the norms of speaking
culture by instructing the Bard Phemius to sing another song than the all-toosad one of her husband Odysseus. Telemachus makes quite a scene shaming
his mother for speaking, as such action is to be taken only by men. 11 And we
know too from this mythic scene that when Lysistrata attempts to make her
great speech on why the Spartans and Athenians should make peace rather
than continue their warring, the Magistrates leer at Lysistrata's body, and jeer
at her for thinking she has any place speaking on matters that are men's.12
We know as well that Cassandra, a truth speaker, was dismissed as a crazy
lady fated to be ignored. 13 The idea that speech was given to all comes into
question.
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Against a vast mythic scene that foregrounds a complex history of ideas
about speech, we come to Aristotle and his treatise Rhetoric. In this book, we
are not drawn to Aristotle's text and the traditions that it encompasses as an
"ever receding horizon." 14 Rather, we are drawn to what is assumed. The
prominent assumptions are that Aristotle couches rhetoric in relation to a
distinctive human capacity of reason and logic to navigate with practical
wisdom the contingencies of civic life. By doing so, rhetoric is theorized as
governing deliberation and decision making in the contingent realms of politics, law, and culture. Based on such assumptions, rhetoric seems inclusive of
all participation and thus is dubbed "the people art." Such assumptions offer
a neutral view of the art as a form of civic engagement.
For this, rhetoric is celebrated. A recognizable trend in recent political
theories of democracy, in particular deliberative democracy, is a tum toward
what political theorist Iris Marion Young calls "some positive political [purposes] of rhetoric." 15 For Young, a rhetorical perspective exposes the false
belief that political deliberation is a coolly and purely rational activity. In
discovering rhetoric, Young discovers a tradition of resistance to the Platonic
privilege of reason over emotion. Why move away from a rational paradigm
of political communication? The reason lies, as Young notes, in the fiction of
rationality's claim to be "impartial and dispassionate," thereby transcending
the "dirty world of interest and passion." 16 As Young argues, to the extent
that democratic theory and practice privilege "allegedly dispassionate, llflsituated, neutral reason, it has exclusionary implications." 17 The tum toward
rhetoric, according to Yollflg, allows at once a tum toward inclusion, for
rhetoric can be used to get an issue on the agenda for deliberation, to fashion
claims to people and people to claims, and to motivate the move from reason
to judgment. In short, the deliberative tum in democracy makes room for
rhetorical dimensions of commllflication that accompany all deliberation, and
in the development of this room that has been Uflderused, participatory inclusion can be forged.
Likewise, Danielle Allen's Talking with Strangers offers Aristotelian rhetorical theory to political theorists of democracy. After exposing anew, in
light of race tension and history, the problems with U.S. democracy in creating a willing minority, Allen proposes rhetoric as the solution: using an
Aristotelian rhetoric, our invention of pluralistic, friend-based, civic speech
will be enhanced. In this vein, Chantal Mouffe's theory of an agonistic politics can be read as a call for a reconnection of politics to the great tradition of
rhetoric. 18 Advancing the notion of democratic deliberation being a primarily
rhetorical activity, Robert Ivie quotes Chantal Mouffe's call "to re-create in
politics the connection with the great tradition of rhetoric." 19 For Ivie, a la
Mouffe, this connection is an emancipatory means for fostering democracy
for it fosters a robust and rowdy democracy, rooted in classical notions of
conflict (agon), yet situated, as Allen idealizes, in political friendship.
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Questions of inclusion, however, vex this scene of rhetoric. While rhetoric might be the people's art, not all are included. The Athenian democracy,
the cultural situation of Aristotle's rhetorical theory, was, in terms of its time,
inclusive of all. Yet, the "all" of Aristotelian rhetorical theory and Athenian
democracy does not include women, let alone slaves, or foreign-born men
residing in Athens. The "all" means in the main Athenian-born men. Whereas damning the Greeks for their nominal-only inclusive "all" would be
anachronistic, calling out the contemporary legacy of using "all" in democratic speech in a nominal-only way would not be. The mask of inclusivity is
more complicated than mere demographics: the problem of nominal inclusivity in ancient Greek rhetorical culture did not go away once others were
invited to the deliberative sphere. Of late, this is evinced in scholarship in the
history of rhetoric with particular consideration given to U.S. immigration
practices and policies. 20
Clearly, we are not the first to notice this problem. Beginning in the
1980s, feminists, in particular, from a variety of disciplines across the humanities have asked many questions and have challenged rhetoric's terms of
inclusion. 21 In the main, critiques and challenges among twentieth-century
century.philosophers, feminists, and rhetoricians issue a call to pay attention
to the ways in which rhetorical theory functions traditionally to exclude or
deny women, rendering rhetoric effectively and paradoxically less than democratic. The judicious course, of which Doris Yoakum's and Lillian O' Conner's work took the lead, was to consider how rhetoric could be theorized to
include women. 22
Generally speaking, we join the conversation with those who critique and
challenge rhetoric's history, theory, and practice. 23 The "Third Sophistic"
movement in rhetoric beginning in the 1980s was devoted to seeing rhetoric
historically and theoretically in relation to the other, who appears in various
forms as woman, alien, barbarian, stranger, or what Victor J. Vitanza calls
the "the third man" or "the third woman." Broadly speaking, "the third"
designates who or what must be excluded. This is so because within rhetoric's history there "is that which must be excluded," as Michelle Ballif explains Vitanza. 24 If there is one common theme among revisionary historiographical work of the past thirty years, it can be found in the phrase "must be
excluded." Exclusion in no way suggests that some are in rhetoric and some
are not. Rather, the "the third 'is symptomatic of the logic of the dialectic. '" 25 Notwithstanding the sustained and growing research in this area, the
question of rhetoric's relationship to the question of inclusion is difficult to
contend with for those who assume a neutral art. 26
Those who assume rhetoric's neutrality are in a position to see its beauty
and power as a force of democratic deliberation and therefore promote rhetoric for its values pertinent to participatory inclusion. To assume the art is
neutral is to impose upon the other a rhetoric that transcends or denies lived
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experiences. As such, those who are systematically excluded from rhetoric
are invited or required to participate in the decision-making process by using
a seemingly neutral tool yet one that established their exclusion and otherness. Any involvement in rhetoric, whether for the sake of history or the sake
of democratic deliberation, means that "we" have an obligation to the excluded. 27 For us, this obligation requires primarily asking two questions:
How is contact configured? What resources are available within the rhetorical tradition for broadening and varying its present configuration?
The rhetoric that many celebrate and strive to renew for the sake of civic
engagement is, at once, designed to function best by seeking to exclude what
it cannot contain or control dialectically. Thus women and others are excluded by peculiar functionalities of rhetoric that mostly are celebrated precisely when they adhere to qualities of dialectical logic that permitted rhetoric to emerge productively to bring contingency under control. This may
seem odd, and rightly so. That contingency is the invariable scene of rhetoric
is axiomatic in the field of rhetoric studies, from Aristotle to modem day.
Perhaps because of its axiomatic status, contingency has not had a great deal
of attention paid to it by rhetorical theorists. Contingency remains the unproblematic and invariable scene of rhetoric in scholarly writings on the idea.
From this scene of contingency, the trajectory of scholarship takes off, in a
celebration of this art of navigating contingency that we call rhetoric.
We begin again near the beginning of Aristotle's Rhetoric. Tracing what
he calls the "contingency thesis" in the history of rhetoric, Dilip Gaonkar
locates its genius in Aristotle's domicile of deliberation, defining contingency in terms of recurrence, not randomness, and thus effectively fusing it to
probability. Quoting Aristotle, Gaonkar says, "A Probability is a thing that
usually happens; not ... anything whatever that usually happens, but only if
it belongs to the class of the 'contingent' or 'variable. "' 28 With this definition, Aristotle creates two types of contingencies. There is contingency associated with probability, and there is a contingency associated with the accidental or random contingencies-sumbebekos. Aristotle expunges random
contingences from rhetoric.
Rhetoric seeks out in any subject those concepts and ideas which are
probable to a class or group. Rhetoric perceives probabilities; it does not
create them. With this in mind, Gaonkar tracks the contingency thesis to
twentieth-century rhetoricians such as Lloyd Bitzer and Thomas Farrell,
showing how they adhere to probability as contingency, situating deliberation in relation to "public knowledge" and "social knowledge." In parallel
fashion, Gaonkar observes how the new rhetoricians, like Kenneth Burke,
and the post foundationalists, like Judith Butler, adhere to the contingency
thesis, mostly by importing Aristotle's notion of probability to the scene of
"practice." This is not to say that post-foundationalists are Aristotelians.
Rather, they deploy the notion of contingency without "adequately thematiz-
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ing it" 29 and, ironically, facilitate the remaking of the foundation they sought
to escape. Aristotle and post-foundationalists both celebrate contingency in
the same way, albeit the post-foundationalists do not know it.
The axiom of rhetoric being an art of navigating contingency in public
life prefigures the expulsion of the other, of radical contingency. That part of
the contingent that falls outside of the doxa gets expunged, discarded, rendered invisible and without authority. And this is why we write. As it turned
out, over these years of our relationship, the most intriguing aspect of our
conversations about contingency led us to a place wherein we eventually set
aside the prevalent view of rhetoric and contingency. Rather, in the course of
our many talks we were invited by each other's perspective to consider how
rhetoric defines contingency and then relies on that definition to prefigure
relations with the other in such a way as to implicate exclusion of difference
through a rhetoric designed to function coherently with modes of argument.
Our various turns in this book work to move contingency toward accident, otherness, alienation, generation, wonder, estrangement, natality. Collectively, we write with aspirations of democratic relations conceived
through an expansive view of contingency because it enables us to configure
contact with the other alliostrophically. Derived from the movement, or
strophe, of the other, alloiosis, an alloiostrophic rhetoric is the precondition
for staging contact with the other in terms that the tradition of rhetoric, the
one which we had put aside, expunged from its own theoretical purview.
What was left remained an unproblematized contingency. We explore this
remainder using tropes.
We write this book as a call to revolutionize rhetorical theory via tropes.
This book contributes to the theorization of rhetoric anew by first calling
attention to a multiplicity of tropes of difference in the remainders of contingency-what Aristotle expelled due to his beliefs about change and his orientation to the earth. The trope of difference offers something new-a new
mode of contact with the other that does not depend on moving, controlling
or turning the other down. Our wager is that a book written to introduce the
trope of difference to the field also offers an awaiting opportunity by which
rhetoric can imagine haptic relations between people in terms of difference
and re-invent itself to emerge in democracy as an art of the people.
To get started on this project, we turn to methodological considerations
that started with our study of tropes. In the past fifty years, tropes and figures
have acquired a status akin to a methodology. 30 Tropes need not be and have
not always been defined exclusively in terms of individual bits. They can be
organized in systems. Classically speaking, rhetoric consists of four systems
of change; each system is formed by and affects the world through corresponding tropes that enable the kind of change the system intends. These four
systems of change, known as the quadripartita ratio, are substitution, subtraction, addition, and transposition. For the sake of convenience, we preview
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four systems of change. Table 0.1 31 identifies and differentiates them by
giving their Greek name followed by examples of tropes that satisfy the
condition of change of each category.
Our methodology is derived from these four categories of change but we
reorganize them and create two operating systems. In particular, we see in
rhetoric two operating systems that we call substitution and transmutation.
Each system, being tropological, is identifiable in terms of form and function
by its relation with change. The systems of operation reveal their form and
function by the kinds of change they enact. Operating systems reveal their
intended use and functionality through a trope or tropes to provide a way to
apprehend the system holistically.
We were prompted to reorganize the quadripartita ratio through our analysis of tropes in relation to change defined in the context of an earth at rest.
The system of substitution utilizes change and motion in terms of the principle ofrest. To tip it another way, the tropes within the system of substitution
all, to varying degrees, turn down. Its governing figures and tropes are in the
range of synonym, metaphor, and antistrophe.
Here is how we look at rhetoric after changing the way we looked at
things. The operating systems we looked at changed from being a quadripartita ratio, flat and impartially related to conceptualizations of change-to a
double operating system-substitution and transmutation-matching and
mirroring rhetoric's bifurcation of change-contingency/probable and contingency/sumbebekos or random contingency. As such, the operating system
of substitution is the frontal system of change. It is prefigured by tropes of
substitution such as antistrophe and is in direct contact with systems of
change that prefigure difference. Working in the parameters of how change
happens on an earth at rest, the frontal system enacts the work of the ruler or
mover. Based on the logic of antistrophe within the theoretical parameters of
an earth at rest, the frontal system turns down the other systems of change.
Specifically, we present the system operating through the tropical sequence

Table0.1.

Rhetorical Systems of Change

Substitution

Subtraction

Kata enallagen

Kataaneian

Addition

Transposition

Kata

Kata metathesin

pleonasmon
syncope

epitheton

apostrophe

anaco/outha

meiosis

metaplasm

tmesis

acyrologia

anesis

polysyndeton

al/oiosis

synonymia

Adapted from Gideon 0. Burton, ''Silva Rhctoricac." cf. Quintilian 5.38.

xx

Introduction

"antistrophe-katastrophe," as it is inscribed in a static model where change is
orchestrated.
The other operating system we call transmutation involves not one but
three systems of change. Comprising tropes of subtraction, addition, and
transposition, the system of transmutation appears to correspond to a great
deal of ideas commonly associated with contingency. By virtue of the second
operating system of tropes, of which al/oiosis is one, its force seemingly
conflicts with the nonns of change associated with an earth at rest. This trope
does not work in isolation: it involves three other systems of change and does
so for good reason.
In an effort to explain why three types of change are crucial for the
operating system of transmutation to engage difference, we consider what
happens if only change by addition is employed. Addition in a system of
substitution has been used as a strategy of including women in the history of
rhetoric. There are at least two explanations for why addition does not work
as a system of change capable of including the other or re-theorizing rhetoric
in a manner that establishes a logic, tropologically speaking, through difference. Barbara A. Biesecker, for example, compares adding women's neglected, lost, or forgotten writings to history to rhetoric's affinnative action
approach. She writes, "Despite its ostensible purpose-to move toward
multiculturalism by adding new items to an ever-expanding list of 'great
works'-the affinnative action agenda conserves the putative authority of the
center by granting· it license to continue to produce official explanations in
the designation of what is and what is not worthy of inclusion." 32 In House of
My Sojourn, Sutton demonstrates how adding women's bodies to the house
of rhetoric creates the technological condition of their exclusion because the
space is designed with tropical resources to add women by subtracting them.
In both cases, adding results in exclusion due to the force of the system of
substitution. Its force can be shown to exist whether one takes the critical
view of history from without and in relation to public policy or whether one
takes the critical view of theory from within and in relation to rhetoric's
technological impact on the body, the doer, and speaker in the civic realm.
All of this is to say that our project is not committed to opening rhetoric to
difference through addition, whether the addition of difference is articulated
in a multicultural sense or implicated in a technical sense by adding the trope
of a/loiosis to rhetorical theory. We are theorizing a transmutational change,
one that cuts across all known forms to an otherwise unknown form that
serves the ends of democratic life. As long as we remain invested in change
as substitution then we remain committed to the other in a particular mode of
contact that "we" are trying to move beyond.
Returning to the four types of change (Table 0.1 ), and summarizing how
we configure the complexity of the two operating systems, the system of
substitution is invested in one type of change, namely substitution, while
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transmutation involves the participation and interaction of three kinds of
change-subtraction, addition, and transposition. Table 0.2 depicts the operating systems and connects them to the kind of change they embrace.
We return to the beginning of our introduction where we talked about
rhetoric in the context of democratic deliberation and revisionary views of it.
All agree that revising rhetoric is a project devoted to change. Our trope
project calls for a revolution because change requires a new methodology. A
new methodology is indispensable for deciphering how the turn toward difference can utilize resources that have been deferred, deflected, or diminished. Rhetoric's "other tropes" and the ability to mobilize resources fonnative of contingency untethered to probability must be equal to rhetoric's
power to restrict change with the trope of antistrophe fonnative of speaking
practices.
From a methodological point of view, the broad aim of this book is to
take a look at both operations in tenns of how they function and to consider
what each operation can tell us about rhetoric's formal relation to the other as
well as how this relation implicates rhetorical theory's ability to act as a
resource for democratic deliberation, to engage contingency, and to effect
democratic change. It is worth mentioning that the word "theory" comes
from the Greek word theorein, a word referring to seeing and observing. So
our view of rhetoric and the terms and definitions we employ are derived
from seeing the art from a theoretical standpoint. By introducing definitions
and new concepts and tropes, we are equipped to make visible or more
accurately to theorize rhetoric performing democratic deliberation as it could
be. The future of rhetoric is open to democratic deliberation. The vision of
democratic deliberation as it has informed the imagination of many is one
such future. There are others.
Our methodology also raises theoretical considerations with respect to the
two operating systems of change. Could the tripartite system held by the
operating system of transmutation replace the static model? The problem, as
we grasp it, is not to return rhetoric to its original domain; the problem is to
recognize where the original domain no longer serves the professed aims of
deliberative democracy. Could the tripartite system be inscribed alongside
the "antistrophic-katastrophic" sequence to effectively produce a metamorphosis not only to radically alter how the "antistrophic-katastrophic" se-

Table 0.2. Operating Systems Distinguished by Type(s) of Change
Operating System of
Substitution

Operating System of Transmutation

Substitution

Subtraction

Adapted from Rhetorical Systems of Change

Addition

Transposition
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quence functions but also mutate the static model, rendering it dynamic?
These questions are already exceeding this book, but not our "trope project."
The future of rhetoric requires a forward-looking impetus that directs us
to seek rhetoric's relation with a multiplicity of tropes not as ornaments or
disembodied general stylistic devices but as embodied perfonnances that are
pre-figurative and operative in the functioning of rhetoric. What we offer in
this book is both new yet ancient, albeit left tmattended and de-authorized for
too long. For the plainest evidence of its ancientness, we can tum to a standard text of the classical rhetorical tradition, Heinrich Lausberg's A Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. Using this reference, widely recognized as a preeminent handbook of classical rhetoric, we can discern that tropes in classical
rhetorical theory were theorized to deviate from "correct" usage, including
accepted usage and normal usage. Tropes tum away from the nonnal. The
normal is what needs escaping, and tropes provide the means of escape. In
particular, deviation, which tropes offer, makes liberation possible.
The antistrophic figure of rhetoric is a case in point. With this trope,
Aristotle deviated from the past and liberated rhetoric for its systematization.
Now antistrophe has become the front-face of meaning making. However, it
is just one trope. We should do more than just amplify this one trope in our
rhetorical theorizing. We have attended before to the front face of the relational dynamic between rhetoric and democracy, what we once called "the
face work of freedom-the face of freedom's discourse."33 Drawing from
Henri Lefebvre, we see these excessive amplifications of the face distort and
brutalize the situation34 and prevent the possibility of contingency and difference. Thus, the alloiostrophic tum must go in many ways to return to the
meaning-making process (because no one has yet figured out how to escape
that return), bringing with it renewed energy that has the capacity for transformation.
This book is devoted to developing the affective, positive and dynamic
structure of the operating system of transmutation by introducing a trope
called al/oiosis, meaning difference, diversity and strangeness. A quite other
trope, alloiosis provides a unique vantage point for taking a closer look at
how, through three systems of change, it could sustain an operating system
associated with democracy without enacting systemic exclusions. At the
same time, al/oiosis offers a methodology-an "a//oio-rhetorics"-for expanding rhetoric through quite other tropological resources that open it to
making contact with difference. At this point in time, the methodology is a
quest for a style ofrhetoric that reflects the complexities of the process of the
operating systems of change.
Toward that end, a new theorization of rhetoric must be formed in a
milieu within and around multiplicity and a complexity of change where new
concepts and new ways of making contact can be shaped. This bears repeating: It is not enough to build a new theory on one system of change.
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To transform rhetoric in relation to change is not to theorize how the other
operates in a system of rhetoric that authorizes contingency to be conceived
in the double context of probability and the accidental, not in a static model
of rhetoric. To say that the earth is not at rest and neither should be rhetoric is
to offer an opportunity to configure contingency otherwise. More importantly, the impact of this new configuration creates a trope of difference and thus
invents a way to begin a new conversation about how to turn toward the other
as opposed to turning down the other. Toward that end, we organized the
book in the following way.
In the first chapter, we deconstruct the figure of traditional rhetorical
theory as antistrophic. In doing so, we expose how rhetorical theory is traditionally designed to turn down possibilities in the meaning-making process
so that a position of rest can be achieved in agreement of all, or at least the
majority, or the wise. Turning down such possibilities might require a wealth
of rhetorical resources, and these resources can even sanction strangeness
from time to time, as Kennerly in chapter 5 astutely shows Aristotle doing in
his treatment of style in Book Ill and as Danielle Allen does in her examination of Aristotle's rhetorical art of learning how to talk to strangers. Nonetheless, change can only go so far if rhetoric hasn't been revolutionized beyond
its antistrophic figuration. We show that this need to turn otherwise can be
theorized through the figure of al/oiostrophe wherein alienation is essential
to transformation.
Next, we offer four etudes with our theory of alloiostrophic rhetoric. Jane
Sutton works alloiostrophically to take us through change and contingency in
the Physics and also, as a consequence, in the Rhetoric, as she takes the two
to be part of an integrated corpus of Aristotle's works. Through her study of
the Physics, she helps us to see that Aristotle bifurcates contingency into that
part aligned with the probable and that part aligned with the accidental. The
probable (eikos) is that which is likely the case. The accidental (sumbebekos)
is that which is neither always nor for the most part. In this bifurcation of
contingency into the accidental and the probable, the probable is privileged.
This privilege then generates necessity, or better yet, produces another generation of necessity, the doxastic generation. This generation is not pure necessity, but rather probability, which is the closest the political realm can get to
necessity, and which must function in civic discourse in place of necessity.
Sutton's work with Physics and Rhetoric exposes that change or contingency
is a critical feature of rhetorical theory, but nevertheless, both change and
contingency function within an economy of an earth at rest. This means
expanding contingency by denying an earth at rest, which ought to be easy
enough as other disciplines-physics and psychology, 35 for example-have
already benefited greatly from their Copernican turns. Once we get on board
with the idea that neither the earth nor rhetoric is at rest, we are free to use
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the resources in Aristotle to imagine rhetoric in a way that is indebted to him
but also free of him.
Hobeika's parataxis of alloiosis is itself alloiotic, as hypotaxis has for a
long time now been the norm of meaning making in scholarly analysis and
argument. Parataxis, characterized by the absence of overt logical connectors between ideas, leaves us wondering at meaning. Kennerly's essay shows
forth the wonder of wonder such as when Homer tells of how Priam and
Achilles, in states of wonder at each other, structure a space of trust and
friendship, and how, in this space, Achilles' anger is resolved. Wonder
sparks self-awareness and solidarity. In meaning making, fresh energy is
created by alienation, estrangement, and awe.
Playing on such energy, Hobeika's paratactic display of alloiosis alienates and thereby transforms the reader by way of making impossible (by way
of not expressing connections, relations, making arguments, drawing conclusions) easy, hence restful, senses of things. Hobeika's parataxis of al/oiosis
alienates readers from the norm and opens up a wondering of what these
ancient flashes of texts are, mean, do, and offer. Parataxis is an irony in a
run-on style: it can slow down meaning, holding us in wonder with no overt
logic, and no easy or ready rendering of meaning. Yet, now we are free to
start playing, imagining, theorizing.
As Kennerly shrewdly discerns, a/loiostrophic estrangement makes possible the freedom to wonder and to be born for others, hence she calls alloiostrophic rhetoric, too, alloiotrophic. The generative potential of alienation and
estrangement has a redemptive effect. We know such a redemptive effect,
from Kenneth Burke, as comic in genre and attitude. 36
Mifsud invites us to wonder in many ways, first at the mechanisms of
correctness as a trope used to excise texts from the rhetorical tradition, then
at a peculiar text that she proposes ought to be made contact with differently,
[Plutarch] Essay on the Life and Poetry ofHomer. From this wondering she
is resourced well to wonder some more, next at Aristophanes' rhetorical
redemption by way of alloiotic gendered performances of gift-giving. This
redemption is transmutative, changing war to peace, misogyny to equality,
and enmity to solidarity, ending in lots oflove and dancing.
Collectively, the energies of transmutation contained in these chapters
evoke the question, does anything go? Sutton's Afterword asks this very
question. There is no simple answer. It requires reflecting on the two operating systems ofrhetoric in terms of agent and agency. Is it possible to imagine
rhetoric consisting of two operating systems, rather than one? Yes. There is
Abraham Lincoln's fragment on Niagara Falls, which offers a vantage point
for theorizing the other as a concept central to democracy. There is Julia
Kristeva's depiction of the chora: The operating systems could be tropes set
in the womb, engendering ways of thinking about contact not only in terms
of the inclusion of the other, as is typical in critiques of classical theories, but
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in terms of what inclusion of the other can offer to the retheorization of
rhetoric. Lincoln and Kristeva are a start. There are others, as an exercise in a
riddle even provokes us to reconsider Aristotle.
All told, this book is what it means to be open to alloiostrophic rhetoric.
To be open is to be positioned to invent. To paraphrase Aristotle's conclusion
to the Rhetoric, I am done, but you are not. This time there are no gods, like
Zeus, to deliver rhetoric anew for the kind of democracy we deserve.
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